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House Committee on Homeland Security and Foreign Influence

Drone Warfare

CAMERON MCMILLAN

Senior Research Analyst

Foundation for Defense of Democracies

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Introduction

Chairman Bruck, Vice Chair Meerman, Vice Chair Mentzer, and distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to join today's hearing.

My name is Cameron McMillan. I am a senior research analyst for the Center on Military and Political Power at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD), a Washington, DC-based, nonpartisan, 501(c)(3) research institute focusing on national security and foreign policy.

Before joining FDD, I served as a U.S. Army Field Artillery officer in the Massachusetts Army National Guard, deploying to Iraq in 2021 as a C-RAM (counter-rocket, artillery, mortar) Battle Captain, where my soldiers and I were responsible for defending against some of the drone threats we will discuss today.

I am grateful for the opportunity to provide remarks today on drone warfare.

Overview

As the wars in Ukraine and the Middle East have demonstrated, drones are playing an increasingly important role in warfare. Indeed, there is an ongoing debate about the extent to which drones have altered the character of war itself. Some claim that drones on the modern battlefield represent a revolution in warfare so significant that it calls for a complete re-orientation of how we fund, train, and equip our military. Others argue that drones, while significant, are best understood as complements to more traditional combat systems and formations, and should be employed in concert with other combined-arms elements such as manned aviation, artillery, infantry, and armor.

What can get lost in this important debate, however, are the basics of how drones are employed and defended against in contemporary conflicts. Understanding the range of drone threats and how they vary by theatre and adversary is essential to begin addressing challenges facing the U.S. military and considerations for homeland defense.

First, the word “drone” is not a monolith. There are a wide range of ground, sea, and aerial drones in various stages of development and currently employed in combat throughout the world today. For the purposes of this hearing, I will focus my presentation on unmanned aerial systems (UAS), not unmanned ground and sea vehicles.

The U.S. military traditionally classifies UAS into five groups delineated by characteristics like size, range, speed, endurance, and payload.¹

¹ D. Max Ferguson and Russell Lemler, “Understanding the Counterdrone Fight: Insights from Combat in Iraq and Syria,” *Modern War Institute*, May 14, 2024. (<https://mwi.westpoint.edu/understanding-the-counterdrone-fight-insights-from-combat-in-iraq-and-syria>); Daniel M. Gettinger, “Defense Primer: Categories of Uncrewed Aircraft Systems,” *Congressional Research Service*, October 25, 2024. (<https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/IF12797>)

U.S. Military UAS Group Chart²

UAS Chart					
	GROUP 1	GROUP 2	GROUP 3	GROUP 4	GROUP 5
					
Range	10-30 km	100-700 km	1,000-2,500 km	200-400 km	>2,000 km
Speed	< 100 knots	< 250 knots	< 250 knots	> 250 knots	> 250 knots
Altitude	< 1,200 ft.	< 3,500 ft.	< 18,000 ft MSL	< 18,000 ft MSL	> 18,000 ft.
Endurance	1-2 hours	18 hours	Approximately 11.5 hours	12 hours	14 hours
Payload	2 KG	5 KG	30-50 KG	100-300 KG	300+ KG
US Equivalent	DJI SBS Raven	Switch Blade Scan Eagle	Shadow RQ-7B	Grey Eagle MQ-1C	Reaper MQ-9

While these groupings are valuable, it can also be useful to classify UAS by functions: tactical UAS, long-range one-way-attack (OWA UAS), and unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAVs).

- *Tactical*: smaller drones that would fall into groups 1 and 2 that can perform a variety functions, including strike, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) and front-line re-supply. This includes first-person-view (FPV) drones, bomber drones, and small fixed-wing surveillance drones.
- *Long-range OWA UAS*: larger drones, generally group 3, that effectively fulfill the same role as cruise missiles.
- *UCAVs*: large drones with extended endurance, range, and the ability to deploy munitions that can perform ISR and strike

² D. Max Ferguson and Russell Lemler, "Understanding the Counterdrone Fight: Insights from Combat in Iraq and Syria," *Modern War Institute*, May 14, 2024. (<https://mwi.westpoint.edu/understanding-the-counterdrone-fight-insights-from-combat-in-iraq-and-syria>); Daniel M. Gettner, "Defense Primer: Categories of Uncrewed Aircraft Systems," *Congressional Research Service*, October 25, 2024. (<https://www.congress.gov/crs-product/IF12797>)

The Role of Drones in the Iran War

Iran has employed long-range OWA drones as one of its most potent tools throughout the current conflict. These long-range OWA drones, such as the Shahed-136, have ranges of 1,000 to 2,500 kilometers and carry payloads of 20 to 90 kg.³ These drones perform a traditional military function of long-range strikes, effectively acting as cheap cruise missiles.

*Shahed-136*⁴



Iran has largely used these drones as part of its long-range strike campaign against U.S. military bases and critical infrastructure of U.S. partners in the Gulf. Their low cost allowed Iran to significantly increase the volume of strikes, making it difficult for the U.S. military to intercept each drone. On March 1, for example, an Iranian drone struck a U.S. operations center in Kuwait, killing six American soldiers.⁵

This strike campaign has been bolstered by Russian support.⁶ Moscow reportedly provided Tehran with satellite imagery and other forms of intelligence to enable Iranian attacks on

³ Benham Ben Taleblu, “Iran’s Support for Russia and Lessons Learned from Ukraine,” *Testimony Before the U.S. Helsinki Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe*, April 21, 2026. (<https://www.csce.gov/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/Taleblu-Testimony.pdf>); David Albright, Sarah Burkhard, and Spencer Faragasso, “Alabuga’s Shahed 136 (Geran-2) Warheads: A Dangerous Escalation,” *Institute for Science and International Security*, May 9, 2024. (<https://isis-online.org/isis-reports/alabugas-shahed-136-geran-2-warheads-a-dangerous-escalation>)

⁴ U.S. Army OE Data Integration Network, “Shahed-136 Iranian Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV),” May 15, 2026. (https://odin.t2com.army.mil/WEG/Asset/Shahed-136_Iranian_Loitering_Munition_Unmanned_Aerial_Vehicle_%28UAV%29)

⁵ Olivia Ireland and Kayla Epstein, “Pentagon identifies six US soldiers killed in Iran war,” *BBC* (UK), March 5, 2026. (<https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c4gq33ynl07o>)

⁶ Bradley Bowman and Cameron McMillan, “How China and Russia keep Iran armed and dangerous,” *Foundation for Defense of Democracies*, August 18, 2026. (<https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2026/08/18/how-china-and-russia-keep-iran-armed-and-dangerous>)

American military positions in the region, likely improving Tehran's ability to target U.S. forces and high-value assets — such as radars and command-and-control sites — with drones and ballistic missiles. Additionally, Russia has aided Iran's long-range OWA drone attack campaign by reportedly sharing valuable drone tactics and technologies tested on the battlefield in Ukraine, including upgraded versions of Iran's Shahed-136.

While Iran's prolific use of drones has been a significant factor throughout the war, it has largely been limited to these long-range OWA drones.

For U.S. forces, drone employment has largely been in the form of traditional UCAVs, such as the MQ-9 Reaper drone, which have long flight durations and sophisticated sensors and can employ munitions such as Hellfire missiles to strike targets.⁷ Unlike long-range OWA attack drones, which are single-use, UCAVs can remain airborne for long periods of time, conduct ISR, employ multiple munitions, and then return to station. Because they are more capable, these drones are much more expensive and difficult to produce at-scale.

*MQ-9 Reaper*⁸



The Iran war also marked America's first ever combat employment of long-range OWA drones, using Low-cost Unmanned Combat Attack Systems (LUCAS) in the opening phases of the conflict.⁹ These drones, similar to Iran's Shahed-136, are an important step for U.S. forces in fielding low-cost long-range strike capabilities that can be produced at scale.

⁷ Tara Copp and Noah Robertson, "U.S. military has lost roughly 25% of its Reaper drones as Iran war depletes arsenal," *The Washington Post*, August 13, 2026. (<https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2026/08/13/us-military-has-lost-roughly-25-its-reaper-drones-iran-war-depletes-arsenal/>); U.S. Air Force, "MQ-9 Reaper," January 2025. (<https://www.af.mil/About-Us/Fact-Sheets/Display/Article/104470/mq-9-reaper>)

⁸ U.S. Department of Defense, Defense Visual Information Distribution System, "MQ-9 back at Twentynine Palms [Image 4 of 4]," August 21, 2023. (<https://www.dvidshub.net/image/7979680/mq-9-back-twentynine-palms>)

⁹ J.D. Simkins, "US confirms first combat use of LUCAS one-way attack drone in Iran strikes," *Military Times*, February 28, 2026. (<https://www.militarytimes.com/news/your-military/2026/02/28/us-confirms-first-combat-use-of-lucas-one-way-attack-drone-in-iran-strikes/>); @CENTCOM, "CENTCOM's Task Force Scorpion Strike - for the first time in history - is using one-way attack drones in combat during Operation Epic Fury. These low-cost drones, modeled after Iran's Shahed drones, are now delivering American-made retribution." *X*, February 28, 2026. (<https://x.com/CENTCOM/status/2027828397087334407>)

The Role of Drones in Ukraine

While drone use in the Iran war has largely been limited to long-range OWA drones and UCAVs, the Ukraine war incorporates a much wider range of drone threats, where they make an impact at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels. The state of the drone war continues to evolve by the day.

At the strategic level, both Russia and Ukraine employ long-range OWA drones as part of their respective long-range strike campaigns. Russia has employed long-range OWA drones against Ukrainian critical infrastructure since 2022, initially relying on thousands of Iranian-provided Shahed drones. Subsequently, Iran helped Russia stand up domestic production of its Geran series OWA drones, which are modeled on the Shahed-136, and which Russia regularly uses in large-scale attacks attempting to overwhelm Ukrainian defenses.¹⁰ Russia has since made improvements to propulsion and targeting with the Geran-3, -4, and -5.¹¹

Ukraine, for its part, has employed its own long-range OWA drones, such as the FP-1, as part of its overall long-range strike campaign against strategic Russian targets like energy, logistics, and military production sites. Ukraine also employs somewhat shorter-range OWA drones as part of its mid-strike campaign against Russian logistics networks, ground lines of communication, and command and control nodes within occupied Ukraine.

*FP-1*¹²



Closer to the front line, both sides employ a range of tactical drones for a variety of functions, including ISR, targeting for artillery, performing strikes themselves, and even aerial resupply. This has created an environment that makes traditional infantry, mechanized, and armored maneuver exceedingly difficult because any forces in the open can be quickly detected and

¹⁰ Benham Ben Taleblu, “Iran’s Support for Russia and Lessons Learned from Ukraine,” *Testimony Before the U.S. Helsinki Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe*, April 21, 2026. (<https://www.csce.gov/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/Taleblu-Testimony.pdf>)

¹¹ Thomas Newdick, “Russia Is Expanding Its Long-Range Strike Drone Network,” *The War Zone*, August 17, 2026. (<https://www.twz.com/news-features/russia-is-expanding-its-long-range-strike-drone-network>)

¹² Emmanuel Grynszpan, “Fire Point, the drone company building Ukraine’s answer to Russia’s Shahed,” *Le Monde* (France), October 29, 2025. (https://www.lemonde.fr/en/international/article/2025/10/29/fire-point-the-drone-maker-building-ukraine-s-answer-to-russia-s-shahed_6746891_4.html)

targeted. This has placed a premium on cover and concealment, and forced Russian and Ukrainian forces to operate in small, dispersed teams during both offensive and defensive operations.

I would encourage members to reference the interactive graphic of a July 2026 Reuters report, which shows what many refer to as the “the kill-zone.”¹³ Depending where you are on the frontline, the kill-zone can range 30 kilometers in depth, with both sides employing small drone teams in conjunction with dispersed infantry and artillery forces as part of their daily operations. Much of this work is done in deeply entrenched and/or buried fighting positions.¹⁴

The state of the drone war continues to evolve by the day, with both Russian and Ukrainian forces rapidly changing their tactics. Both Russian and Ukrainian forces continually adapt to electronic counter-measures, such as jamming, and make refinements to the technology and tactics, techniques, and procedures of drone employment. For example, fiber-optic FPV drones are used as a means of bypassing traditional jamming countermeasures, as the drone is connected by a physical optical fiber cable rather than through electronic frequencies that can be jammed.

Likewise, both Russia and Ukraine have demonstrated an increasing ability to mass-produce various types of drones at-scale. Russia, for example, produces roughly 3,000 Geran-4 and Geran-5 long-range OWA attack drones per month, according to Ukrainian intelligence estimates.¹⁵ In July, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky announced that Ukraine would seek to increase its drone production rate of 10 million per year, the majority of which are small, tactical drones, to 20 million per year.¹⁶

Challenges Facing the United States

The increased production and use of drones by our adversaries have profound implications for how the United States funds, trains, and equips its military. America now confronts one of the most dangerous geostrategic environments since 1945, in no small part because of the emergence of a new Axis of Aggressors consisting of China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea. The cooperation in drone warfare covered in this presentation is only one example of the many ways in which these adversaries are making each other more capable and increasing the chances that the United States may find itself fighting simultaneous major wars for which Washington is not prepared.¹⁷

¹³ Mariano Zafra, Mike Collett-White, Tom Balmforth, and Max Hunder, “Inside Ukraine’s Kill Zone,” *Reuters*, July 23, 2026. (<https://www.reuters.com/graphics/UKRAINE-CRISIS/KILL-ZONE/znpnojmknv1>)

¹⁴ Cassandra Vinograd and Oleksandr Chubko, “‘Counting Every Day’: The Soldier Who Spent More Than a Year on the Front Line,” *The New York Times*, December 27, 2025. (<https://www.nytimes.com/2025/12/27/world/europe/ukraine-russia-frontline.html>)

¹⁵ Jimmy Rushton, “As Russia turns to jet-powered drones, Ukraine scrambles for new interceptor tech,” *Kyiv Independent* (Ukraine), August 22, 2026. (<https://kyivindependent.com/arms-race-in-the-skies-as-jet-powered-drones-swarm-ukraine>)

¹⁶ “Zelensky Says Ukraine Plans to Double Drone Production to 20M Per Year,” *Kyiv Post* (Ukraine), July 15, 2026. (<https://www.kyivpost.com/post/80328>)

¹⁷ Bradley Bowman, Logan Rolleigh, and Cameron McMillan, “Axis of Aggressors Military Cooperation Is Worse Than You Think,” *Real Clear Defense*, August 7, 2026. (https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2026/08/07/axis_of_aggressors_military_cooperation_is_worse_than_you_think_1198741.html)

As Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Dan Caine warned in June 2025, these four authoritarian adversaries are “pursuing unprecedented levels of cooperation.”¹⁸ Unfortunately, their cooperation has grown since then. A new book, *Axis of Aggressors: Countering the Cooperation of China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea*, by my FDD colleagues Bradley Bowman, Elaine Dezenski, and RADM (Ret.) Mark Montgomery, reinforces Gen. Caine’s assessments and underscores how Axis cooperation is empowering America’s adversaries in Europe, the Middle East, and the Pacific.¹⁹

Each of these adversaries presents different challenges for the U.S. military to remain ready and capable of deterring and, if necessary, defeating aggression in the era of drone warfare. In the Middle East, for example, Iran’s prolific use of long-range OWA drones demands a dramatic increase in ground-based interceptor systems to defend U.S. military positions and partner critical infrastructure. In the Pacific, these ground-based interceptors will be needed to defend American bases in the Western Pacific that are critical for operations in a conflict with China. Likewise, expeditionary forces will need drone defense of their own that can be quickly employed, operated, and maintained in an expeditionary setting.

In Europe and Korea, protecting large, static bases is only part of the challenge. Because these theatres would require U.S. forces to conduct large-scale ground combat operations, counter-drone defenses must be dispersed down to the lowest-level possible to allow infantry and armored formations to maneuver on the battlefield.

The U.S. military is currently behind in the adaptation cycle of drone warfare. Defensively, the Iran war has revealed costly gaps in defending bases against long-range OWA drones. The U.S. Army has undertaken a series of initiatives to adapt the lessons of the Ukraine war into its existing force, but it will take time for these efforts to translate into updated force structure and doctrine, trained personnel, and fielded combat capabilities. Unfortunately, the Army has recently taken steps in the opposite direction, such as disbanding an experimental drone assault battalion tasked with integrating lessons from Ukraine.²⁰

America’s defense industry also has an important role to play in ensuring the United States is capable of effectively deterring and fighting future conflicts. In order to produce cheap and effective drones and counter-drone systems at the scale needed in modern warfare, industry requires large, multi-year procurement contracts and clear demand signals from the Pentagon and Congress. This multi-year procurement process, however, must be matched with the need for rapid adaptation, which the war in Ukraine has demonstrated is required in modern drone warfare.

¹⁸ Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General John Daniel Caine, USAF, “Statement of General John Daniel Caine, USAF 22 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Department of Defense Budget Hearing,” *Testimony Before the House Armed Services Committee*, June 12, 2025. (https://armedservices.house.gov/uploadedfiles/gen_caine_posture_written_statement.pdf)

¹⁹ Bradley L. Bowman, Elaine K. Dezenski, RADM (Ret.) Mark Montgomery, *Axis of Aggressors* (Washington, DC: Armin Lear Press, 2026).

²⁰ Eve Sampson, “US Army to end experimental drone battalion in Europe,” *Military Times*, August 12, 2026. (<https://www.militarytimes.com/news/your-military/2026/08/21/us-army-to-end-experimental-drone-battalion-in-europe>)

The clearest path forward to addressing these gaps is working with Ukraine, which has much to teach the United States on how to scale effective and adaptive systems, and employ them with the proper doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures. This includes developing and producing large quantities of inexpensive, ground-based interceptors, which Ukraine operates effectively to counter Russian long-range OWA drones. Likewise, cooperation should include efforts to improve the jamming and electronic warfare capabilities fielded by U.S. forces that are required to successfully defend against both long-range OWA drones and tactical drones.

Considerations for Homeland Defense

Americans should not assume that the homeland will be a sanctuary in a future conflict. A variety of means, particularly cyber, can be used to target American military and critical infrastructure that is part of the U.S. military's mobilization process. My FDD colleagues in the Center on Cyber and Technology Innovation have done remarkable research on this topic, documenting gaps in our cyber defenses and vulnerabilities in America's critical infrastructure and military mobility, and provided detailed policy recommendations for lawmakers.²¹

As Ukrainian drone operations inside Russia and Israeli drone operations inside Iran have demonstrated, drones can be used to target strategic assets like bomber bases or air and missile defense systems. In June 2025, Ukraine launched an audacious attack on Russian airbases throughout Russia, launching small FPV drones from trucks parked near their intended targets, destroying Russian aircraft on the ground, including strategic bombers.²²

The attack caused many in the United States to ask about the vulnerabilities of American strategic bomber bases in Louisiana and North Dakota to a similar-style attack. But our concern should not be limited solely to bases hosting strategic assets. Michigan's Selfridge Air National Guard Base, for example, hosts the 127th Wing and operates aerial refueling tankers. These types of aircraft are a critical element of how the United States projects military power abroad, and would be used extensively in the event of an American military mobilization during a conflict with a near-peer adversary.

Likewise, Russian drone activity over Europe as part of Moscow's ongoing hybrid campaign against NATO demonstrates the threat to critical infrastructure like civilian airports. Earlier this month, a drone equipped with explosives was discovered at a civilian airport in Germany, which U.S. intelligence reportedly assessed was likely connected to Russia.²³

²¹ Annie Fixler, RADM (Ret.) Mark Montgomery, and Rory Lane, "Military Mobility Depends on Secure Critical Infrastructure," *Foundation for Defense of Democracies*, March 27, 2025.

(<https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2025/03/27/military-mobility-depends-on-secure-critical-infrastructure>)

²² Jeff Schogol, "The aftermath of Operation Spider's Web and what it means for the US military," *Task & Purpose*, June 6, 2025. (<https://taskandpurpose.com/news/operation-spiders-web-ukraine-russia>); Lazar Berman and Emanuel Fabian, "Mossad set up drone base in Iran, UAVs took out missile launchers overnight," *The Times of Israel* (Israel), June 13, 2025. (<https://www.timesofisrael.com/mossad-set-up-drone-base-in-iran-uavs-took-out-missile-launchers-overnight>)

²³ Lara Seligman and Shelby Holliday, "U.S. Intel Links Russia to Explosive Drone at German Airport," *The Wall Street Journal*, August 7, 2026. (<https://www.wsj.com/world/europe/u-s-intel-links-russia-to-explosive-drone-at-german-airport-8a69a823>)

State governments have an important role to play in protecting the citizens of their states and our nation's ability to defend itself. This is especially important in protecting essential state and local services to citizens and other U.S. critical infrastructure needed in the event of military mobilization. The U.S. military relies on civilian-owned rail-networks, ports, and airports to quickly mobilize American forces in the event of a conflict with a near-peer adversary. Ensuring that state and local agencies can coordinate effectively with military authorities, including the National Guard, upon mobilizing will be key to defending the critical infrastructure our military relies on to move personnel and equipment throughout the country and overseas.

Many of the drone defenses used in the military domain, such as kinetic interceptors and jamming, would present significant risk if applied in a civilian setting. Additionally, it is likely impractical and unrealistic to expect every piece of critical infrastructure in the United States to be supplied with the kind of layered drone defenses required to be successful. That is why identifying infrastructure most needed for essential services and military mobilization, as well as creating plans between federal, state, local, and military authorities to properly defend those sites upon military mobilization are the clearest path forward.

But that does not mean that nothing can or should be done short of mobilization. Likewise, not all solutions are confined to the military domain. For example, my FDD colleagues Jack Burnham, Emmerson Overell, and Annie Fixler have written extensively on the importance of restricting drone overflights over critical infrastructure. In a July 2026 report, they wrote:

Unmanned aircraft have become an increasingly serious threat to U.S. critical infrastructure. Small, commercially available drones can bypass traditional perimeter defenses to conduct surveillance, collect sensitive facility data, or deliver conductive materials, incendiary devices, and explosives. Recent incidents involving electrical substations, military installations, and other sensitive facilities demonstrate that this threat is no longer abstract, while advances in autonomy and payload capacity will only make these systems more difficult to detect and defeat.²⁴

Likewise, my colleagues in FDD's China Program have worked extensively on how to restrict Chinese-made drones and components in U.S. supply chains.²⁵ In an August 2026 report by FDD's Jack Burnham, Craig Singleton, and RADM (Ret.) Mark Montgomery, they warned about the dangers that China's drone industry present to U.S. national security:

China's drone industry poses a clear and present danger to U.S. national security, providing Beijing with espionage capabilities and presenting physical and cyber threats to U.S. critical infrastructure.

²⁴ Jack Burnham, Emmerson Overell, and Annie Fixler, "Designation-Restrict the Operation of Unmanned Aircraft in Close Proximity to a Fixed Site Facility," *Foundation for Defense of Democracies*, July 31, 2026. (<https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2026/07/31/14-cfr-parts-1-74-91-and-107>)

²⁵ Jack Burnham, "FCC Introduces New Bans on Chinese-Produced Equipment Linked to Cyber Risks," *Foundation for Defense of Democracies*, June 30, 2026. (<https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2026/06/30/fcc-introduces-new-bans-on-chinese-produced-equipment-linked-to-cyber-risks>)

Beijing has directed substantial subsidies toward its domestic unmanned aerial system (UAS) sector, primarily aiming to ensure that its firms capture significant market share within the United States and other global markets. This effort has been highly effective, offering the People's Republic of China (PRC) significant leverage over critical American supply chains across a range of industries, including search and rescue, agriculture, and critical infrastructure management.²⁶

Conclusion

The use of drones in contemporary warfare is the new normal. Whether fielded by nation-states, like the ones we discussed today, or by non-state actors, including designated terrorist groups, combatants across the world increasingly develop and employ new means of employing and defending against drones in a range of environments and conflicts. Hezbollah, for example, has used FPV drones to target the Israel Defense Forces in southern Lebanon, while Iranian-backed militias in Iraq have used FPVs and OWA drones against U.S. military positions in Iraq, Syria, and Jordan.²⁷

The U.S. military faces a range of drone threats and room for innovation about how to best employ drones across theatres of current and potential future conflict in the Middle East, Europe, and the Pacific. Fielding a force capable of deterring and, if necessary, effectively fighting in contemporary conflicts demands integrating the lessons learned from the wars in Ukraine and the Middle East into the existing force. It will also require examining traditional assumptions underlying requirements, force posture, training, and doctrine.

But just as our adversaries are pursuing a comprehensive strategy against us, our response must be comprehensive, too, encompassing federal, state, and local governments, as well as the private sector.

Thank you for your time and convening this important hearing. I look forward to your questions.

²⁶ Jack Burnham, Craig Singleton, and RADM (Ret.) Mark Montgomery, "Section 232 National Security Investigation of Imports of Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) and their parts and components," *Foundation for Defense of Democracies*, August 6, 2025. (<https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2025/08/06/section-232-national-security-investigation-of-imports-of-unmanned-aircraft-systems-uas-and-their-parts-and-components>)

²⁷ David Daoud and Ahmad Sharawi, "FPV drones are the logical evolution of Hezbollah's warfighting doctrine," *Foundation for Defense of Democracies*, June 11, 2026. (<https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2026/06/11/fpv-drones-are-the-logical-evolution-of-hezbollahs-warfighting-doctrine/>); Cameron McMillan and Bradley Bowman, "The consequences of US weakness in Iraq and Syria," *FDD's Long War Journal*, April 10, 2024. (<https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2024/04/analysis-the-consequences-of-us-weakness-in-iraq-and-syria.php>); Thomas Newdick, "Drone attack on parked U.S. Army Black Hawk in Iraq a harbinger of what's to come," *The War Zone*, March 25, 2026. (<https://www.twz.com/air/drone-attack-on-parked-u-s-army-black-hawk-in-iraq-a-harbinger-of-whats-to-come>)